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A Felicitous Meme: The Eleventh
Circuit Solves the Preiser Puzzle?
Lisa N. Beckmann*
Arthur O. Brown**
I. THE PUZZLE REVISITED
This Article is about a legal phenomenon known as the Preiser
Puzzle. More precisely, the article concerns a possible solution to the
Preiser Puzzle articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. In part, this Article has a descriptive aim: The
Authors will explain the Eleventh Circuit’s solution both in the abstract
(this section, below), and by giving issue–specific examples in section
three that may prove useful to practitioners. Important issues at
present include: (a) challenges to parole procedures, (b) method of
execution challenges, and (c) requests for release from administrative
segregation. Yet this Article also has an important normative aim.
To appreciate both aims, one must first revisit the Preiser Puzzle,1
and the eponymous case of Preiser v. Rodriguez.2 Preiser concerned a
prisoner’s claim for the restoration of good-time credits, withdrawn for
bad behavior, that would have led to a speedier release.3 The prisoner
advanced this claim in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,4 but the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the prisoner should
instead have raised the claim in a habeas action.5 The Court stated that
*Mercer

University School of Law (J.D., 1992).
Law School (J.D., 2013).
1. For an example of earlier scholarship to address the Preiser Puzzle, see Martin A.
Schwartz, The Preiser Puzzle: Continued Frustrating Conflict Between the Civil Rights
and Habeas Corpus Remedies for State Prisoners, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 85 (1988).
2. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
3. Id. at 477 (“[A] prisoner serving an indeterminate sentence may . . . earn up to 10
days per month good-behavior-time credit toward [a] reduction of the maximum term of
his sentence.”).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
5. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489.
**Cornell
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claims “attacking the very duration of . . . physical confinement” fall
within the “core of habeas.”6 Preiser thus stands for the proposition that
core habeas claims must be raised in a habeas action, not a § 1983
action.7
Where there is a core, there is an implied penumbra, so Preiser left
open the possibility of residual overlap between habeas and § 1983,
which is to say that Preiser created a puzzle. In truth, though, the
puzzle arises from broad statutory language. Section 1983 grants, on
the one hand, a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights . . .
secured by the Constitution.”8 The prisoner in Preiser, for example,
asserted a due process violation based on the deprivation of goodconduct-time credits without notice of the underlying grounds, or an
opportunity to challenge those grounds.9
Habeas, on the other hand, affords a remedial avenue for persons “in
custody in violation of the Constitution.”10 Again, Preiser explains that
core habeas claims seek a shorter duration of custody.11 Suppose,
though, that a prisoner argues his circumstances of confinement are
inhumanly “cruel” in Eighth Amendment jargon. This claim, if valid,
could be remedied through an outright release obtained in a habeas
action, but the cruel nature of the prisoner’s confinement might
alternatively be remedied through corrective changes to the custodial
facility, or by a transfer to a less cruel facility. Conceivably, these latter
remedies could be obtained in either a habeas action or in a § 1983
action, although prevailing thought prefers the § 1983 route. The
crucial point is that by carving out a core of habeas, Preiser
acknowledged an overlap between § 1983 and penumbral habeas issues,
and it left to lower courts the delicate task of navigating this overlap.12

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 487–88.
Id. at 489–90.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 482.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1996).
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489–90.
Id. at 503–04.
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The residual overlap between habeas and § 1983 is undesirable for
two reasons. One reason is the goal of judicial efficiency in face of
steadily numerous prisoner filings. During the twelve-month period
ending on March 31, 2020, for example, state prisoners commenced in
the federal district courts approximately 42,400 habeas and § 1983
actions combined.13 The Preiser Puzzle impedes the courts’ ability to
efficiently process these cases.
A second reason is fairness to litigants, who must untangle the
Preiser Puzzle in an effort merely to present their claims for a hearing
on the merits. Courts and scholars have, for decades now, expressed
frustration over Preiser’s lack of guidance and workability.14 If trained
jurists cannot solve the Preiser Puzzle, then it is unreasonable to expect
pro se prisoners to do so.15

13. Federal
Judicial
Caseload
Statistics
2020
Tables,
U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2020-tables
(last updated Mar. 31, 2020).
14. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 179 (“[f]ifteen years of uncertainty and confusion is
long enough. It is up to Congress and the Supreme Court finally to provide the rosetta
stone for solving Preiser puzzles.”).
15. Of course, a cynic might argue that Preiser’s complexity is a feature, not a flaw.
See, e.g., Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 522 (2002) (observing a Congressional aim to
“curtail suits” by prisoners).
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It is in this context that one should adjudge a possible solution to the
Preiser Puzzle articulated by the Eleventh Circuit. Beginning with
Hutcherson v. Riley,16 the Eleventh Circuit declared that habeas and
§ 1983 offer “mutually exclusive” avenues for relief.17 This possible
answer to Preiser, what this Article dubs the Hutcherson approach,
obviates the need for any notion of a core of habeas.18 Rather, the
Hutcherson approach elides core and penumbral habeas issues, thereby
creating a seemingly simple binary choice that is the product of a
bright-line rule. Under Hutcherson, courts simply ask whether a claim
should be raised in habeas or § 1983.19
Habeas

§ 1983

The Hutcherson Solution to the Preiser Puzzle
Bright line rules promote clarity, and for that reason, it is the
Authors’ opinion that the Hutcherson approach is, on balance, desirable.
That normative conclusion, though, is a close call because the Eleventh
Circuit’s rule of mutual exclusivity is dubious for many reasons. Section
four of this Article discusses practical problems, such as the burden of
determining, through a trial-and-error process, what claims correspond
to which action type, either habeas or § 1983. Section four also
addresses the critical problem of application errors. That problem is
critical because it threatens to erode Hutcherson’s primary selling point,
clarity.
16.
17.
18.
19.

468 F.3d 750 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 754.
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487.
Hutcherson, 468 F.3d at 754.
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Although the bulk of this Article will focus on practical points—
section three addresses mechanics, section four addresses practical
problems, and section five offers a final assessment—the following
section attempts to refute certain abstract criticisms that the
Hutcherson approach will undoubtedly face. Chief among those
criticisms is the solution’s discreditable origin. In brief, the Eleventh
Circuit’s rule of mutual exclusivity arises from (1) a stray misstatement
of Preiser’s holding, and (2) a subsequent enforcement of that
misstatement as a rule of law. As explained below, the Hutcherson
approach appears to be a successful legal meme.
The Authors hope to give in this Article a clear-eyed assessment of
the Hutcherson approach, and to explain why, despite its dubious origin
and some significant drawbacks, the Hutcherson approach offers an
attractive solution to the Preiser Puzzle. If the Eleventh Circuit’s rule of
mutual exclusivity is indeed a meme, it is nevertheless a felicitous one
worthy of close consideration and potential adoption by other circuits.
II. METAPHYSICS AND MEMES: ABSTRACT CRITICISMS OF HUTCHERSON
Before diving into the practicalities of the Hutcherson approach—
namely, the questions of how and whether Hutcherson will work—the
Authors hope to refute three abstract criticisms that Hutcherson is
likely to face. Those criticisms, addressed in turn below, are (1) the
metaphysical erosion of habeas, (2) the Eleventh Circuit’s failure to
provide analysis, and (3) the accusation that Hutcherson is a legal
meme. None of these criticisms should forestall an adoption of
Hutcherson’s rule of mutual exclusivity.
A. The Metaphysical Erosion of Habeas
The mutually exclusive treatment of habeas and § 1983 is bound to
require judicial line drawing, and critics will argue that some such lines
erode the right to habeas corpus, as enshrined by reference in Article I,
section 9, clause 2 of the United States Constitution.20 That is, when
judges employing the Hutcherson approach declare that a penumbral
habeas issue should be raised in a § 1983 claim, as opposed to a habeas
action, critics will argue that these judges are eroding the constitutional
right to habeas. That criticism is premised on the unlikely, but
theoretically possible premise that Congress might repeal or
significantly modify § 1983. According to critics, a penumbral habeas

20. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 (“[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.”).
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claim channeled into § 1983 litigation may “go poof” if § 1983 is
repealed.
For reasons discussed below, the Authors believe that this criticism
of Hutcherson approach is too metaphysical to take very seriously. The
criticism needs mention, though, if only because members of the federal
judiciary have already voiced it. Judge Berzon’s dissent in Nettles v.
Grounds,21 a United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
decision, offers the clearest example yet:
More broadly, the PLRA’s restrictions on prisoner suits demonstrate
the hazards of limiting habeas corpus due to potential overlap with
other remedies. The writ of habeas corpus is protected by the
Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. There is no such explicit
protection for the remedy afforded by § 1983 (which, indeed, did not
even exist until after the Civil War). As the PLRA shows, Congress
can alter § 1983 at will, to make it more or less available to
particular groups like prisoners. Relying on the existence of
alternative statutory remedies to justify narrowing the breadth of
habeas thus may create gaps that widen over time as Congress alters
those remedies. This potential problem is made more likely if we read
the existence vel non of other statutory schemes to indicate
Congress’s implicit intent to limit habeas’s scope. Such an
arrangement risks encroachment on the “grand purpose” of one of the
most important remedies of our legal order.22

Of course, the criticism’s appearance in a dissent suggests that it has
not been overly persuasive. Yet the conventional judicial response to the
criticism is not altogether convincing either because it depends upon a
divining of Congressional intent. That is, the conventional judicial
response, as advanced by the Nettles majority opinion, cites a supposed
Congressional intent, divined from the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)23 and the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA),24 to “channel prisoner litigation,” and specifically to make
§ 1983 “the exclusive vehicle for suits about prison life,” and “the
exclusive vehicle for claims that are not within the core of habeas.”25 In
full, the most relevant part of the Nettles majority opinion reads as
follows:

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

830 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 945 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996).
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013).
Nettles, 830 F.3d at 931, 933.
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Just as Congress’s amendments to the habeas statute indicated an
intent to make habeas the exclusive remedy for claims at the core of
habeas . . . Congress’s enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act . . . indicated an intent to make § 1983 the exclusive remedy for
all inmate suits about prison life[.] The PLRA was intended to
promote administrative redress, filter out groundless claims, and
foster better prepared litigation of claims aired in court . . . . Before
the PLRA, plaintiffs pursuing actions under § 1983, including
prisoner
suits
alleging
constitutional
deprivations
while
incarcerated[,] did not have to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing suit in court[.] But Congress enacted § 1997e(a) to
reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits by
requiring exhaustion . . . . Congress intended this exhaustion
requirement to have broad scope[.] . . . . Congress’s intent that state
prisoners satisfy PLRA requirements for all § 1983 suits about
prisoner life (other than claims at the core of habeas) suggests that
Congress wanted § 1983 to be the exclusive vehicle for such claims.
As in Preiser, it would wholly frustrate explicit congressional intent
to hold that prisoners could evade the requirements of the PLRA by
the simple expedient of putting a different label on their
pleadings . . . .
Moreover,
because
Congress
enacted
the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 . . . at the
same time as it enacted the PLRA, we infer that Congress did not
intend to make § 1983 and habeas regimes interchangeable or
overlapping. AEDPA added procedural requirements for prisoners
bringing habeas corpus petitions that are separate and distinct from
those imposed on § 1983 claims by the PLRA . . . indicating an intent
to make these regimes independent and mutually exclusive.26

The Nettles majority’s reasoning is unlikely to satisfy readers
skeptical of the courts’ ability to divine Congressional intent from a
statutory synthesis.27 Similarly, some readers (along with the Authors)
are bound to disagree with the assertion, by the Nettles majority, that
Supreme Court precedent “strongly suggest[s] that habeas is available
only for state prisoner claims that lie at the core of habeas (and is the
exclusive remedy for such claims), while § 1983 is the exclusive remedy
for state prisoner claims that do not lie at the core of habeas.”28 As
discussed in section three, there is tension between a mutually

26. Id. at 932.
27. John F. Manning, Essay: Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 2397, 2407 (2017) (“in the hard cases, ‘Congress’ has not actually formed an
intention on (viz. resolved) the precise question at issue . . . . [W]hen meaning runs out,
judges must acknowledge their own creative or lawmaking function rather than pretend
to reconstruct legislative intent.”).
28. Nettles, 830 F.3d at 930.
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exclusive paradigm on the one hand, and existing Supreme Court
precedent on the other.
In truth, Judge Berzon’s metaphysical criticism of the Hutcherson
approach calls for a metaphysical response that is likely better suited to
the forum of legal scholarship, rather than a judicial opinion. By
offering the following two observations, the Authors hope to give at
least the beginnings of such a metaphysical response.
First, Judge Berzon’s assertion that habeas is “protected by the
Constitution” is not a useful starting point for a comparison between
habeas and § 1983.29 As with § 1983, the reality is that state prisoners
lacked access to federal habeas review until 1867, after the Civil War,
with the passage of the Act of Feb. 5, 1867.30 Prior to that time, the
courts interpreted Article I, § 9, clause 2 of the Constitution as
enshrining a right to seek federal habeas review only for persons
detained in federal custody.31 Given this historical background, and in
an age where Bivens32 is disfavored, critics like Judge Berzon must, to
be taken seriously, first explain whether and how state prisoners now
possess a constitutional cause of action to seek federal habeas relief.
Does Judge Berzon, for example, view the Suspension Clause as “a oneway ratchet that enshrines in the Constitution every [statutory] grant
of habeas jurisdiction[?]”33 Absent such an explanation, there is little
reason to fear that Hutcherson’s rule of mutual exclusivity is eroding a
constitutional right to habeas.
Second, and more importantly, there is little reason to worry that
Hutcherson mutual exclusivity will erode anything, because the scope of
federal habeas review is fluid. Upon the unlikely repeal of § 1983,
history suggests that the judiciary would adapt by expanding the scope
of habeas—that is, by drawing new lines permitting courts to entertain
penumbral habeas claims in habeas corpus actions. Habeas fluidity is
well established. Beginning as a mere “nuisance,” federal habeas review
of state prisoners’ claims briefly swelled to become a surrogate for
Supreme Court appellate review before retrenching to a compromise
point, as later codified (more or less) by AEDPA.34 The Court has
29. Id. at 945 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
30. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659 (1996); Act of Feb. 5, 1867, Ch. 28, 14
Stat. 385.
31. See Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. 103, 105 (1844).
32. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
33. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 342 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. See Anna S. Roy, Constitutional Law—Eleventh Circuit Rejects Federal “Look
Through” Approach on Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions, 50 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 375, 378–
79 (2017) (“federal habeas review has expanded and contracted”).
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continued to employ fluidity even after the passage of AEDPA, most
notably by injecting a doctrine of equitable tolling into AEDPA’s
statutory timeliness scheme. It is difficult to rationalize this fluidity—
the courts say, cryptically, that habeas is “governed by equitable
principles,”35 while scholars note that habeas appears to be
“respons[ive] to the contemporary political landscape.”36 The critical
point, though, is not how habeas fluidity works, but generally that it
works.
Even if one accepts the highly improbable repeal of § 1983 as a
genuine risk for the sake of argument, the circuit courts may and
should dismiss as too metaphysical Judge Berzon’s speculative
constitutional concerns, along with her concern that the judiciary would
passively watch as penumbral habeas claims “go poof.” As in the past,
the courts will alter the scope of habeas review as necessary to preserve
The Great Writ.
B. A Failure to Communicate
A second criticism is that the Eleventh Circuit failed to offer
sufficient explanation or analysis when developing its Hutcherson
approach. This criticism is valid, but it is not specific to Hutcherson,
and it should not forestall an adoption of the Hutcherson approach.
In setting a rule of mutual exclusivity between habeas and § 1983,
Hutcherson stated the following, while citing only Supreme Court
caselaw for support:
An inmate convicted and sentenced under state law may seek federal
relief under two primary avenues: a petition for habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 . . .
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . . These avenues are mutually
exclusive: if a claim can be raised in a federal habeas petition, that
same claim cannot be raised in a separate § 1983 civil rights action.37

As discussed in section three (and as illustrated by section one’s
graphics), neither Preiser nor any other Supreme Court case has held
that habeas and § 1983 are mutually exclusive. Rather, Preiser and its
progeny preserve the possibility of penumbral overlap while also
holding that core habeas claims must be raised in habeas. It is the
Hutcherson approach, a circuit court creation, that develops the law by

35. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438
(1963)).
36. Roy, supra note 34, at 378.
37. Hutcherson, 468 F.3d at 754.
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eliding core and penumbral habeas issues, and by placing claims on
either side of a bright line separating habeas from § 1983.
One can confidently say, therefore, that the Hutcherson opinion
suffers from at least one of three possible errors. First, it is possible
that Hutcherson’s reference to “mutual exclusivity” is a stray
misstatement, and that the Hutcherson panel did not intend to work
any development in the law. This seems unlikely, because the
Hutcherson opinion comes close also to describing its rule of mutual
exclusivity in functional terms: “When an inmate challenges the
circumstances of his confinement but not the validity of his conviction
and/or sentence, then the claim is properly raised [meaning exclusively
raised?] in a civil rights action under § 1983.”38
Second, it is possible that the Hutcherson panel simply
misinterpreted Supreme Court caselaw, incorrectly believing that the
high Court already had set a rule of mutual exclusivity.39 Third, it is
instead possible that the Hutcherson panel was consciously attempting
to develop the law, but that it chose to do so by fiat rather than
reasoned elaboration.
Better judicial process could have prevented errors two and three. If
the Hutcherson panel incorrectly believed that Supreme Court
precedent dictated mutual exclusivity (error two), then a written
analysis of that precedent might have revealed to the Hutcherson panel
its error. Similarly, if the Hutcherson panel was attempting
independently to develop mutual exclusivity, then it should have done
so through an opinion of better quality—that is, an opinion, like the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Nettles, offering some measure of legal
reasoning (error three). In either case, the Hutcherson opinion stands as
a small source of reputational harm for the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals.
On balance, the Authors are inclined to believe that the Hutcherson
opinion suffers from error three, meaning that the Hutcherson panel
was attempting to develop a rule of mutual exclusivity through a
“poorly reasoned and unilluminating opinion.”40 It is no contradiction,
though, to say that a poor judicial opinion may yield a sound rule or
38. Id.
39. The question of habeas and § 1983 overlap, expressly perceived as open in Bell v.
Wolfish, has never been resolved by the Supreme Court. 441 U.S. 520, 526 n.6 (1979)
(“[w]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus
to obtain review of the conditions of confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the
confinement itself.”).
40. David Wolitz, Alexander Bickel and the Demise of Legal Process Jurisprudence, 29
CORNELL J. L. PUB. POL. 153, 173–74 (2019) (“reason is the life of the law and not just
votes for your side.”).
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result with Brown v. Board of Education41 serving, perhaps, as the
archetypal example. Criticisms of the Hutcherson opinion’s reasoning,
therefore, should not forestall careful consideration and the potential
adoption by other circuits of Hutcherson’s rule of mutual exclusivity,
which may in the end prove a sound solution to the Preiser Puzzle.
C. Wariness of Legal Memes
As a third and final abstract criticism, consider that the Hutcherson
approach is likely to be categorized as a legal meme. In the remainder
of this section, the Authors hope to explain what a legal meme is, why
the Hutcherson approach fits the definition of a legal meme, and why
the Hutcherson approach, even if a legal meme, is nevertheless a
felicitous one.
First, take as the definition of a meme, a “conceptual form[] that
replicate[s] through a community of people.”42 Memes are purposefully
“analogous to [their] biological correlate, the gene,” and the impetus
behind scholarly meme theory is to determine whether evolutionary
principles might help to explain the successful (or unsuccessful)
dispersion of ideas.43 In principle, a legal meme is simply any meme
that has, as its substance, a legal concept. By this broad and largely
unhelpful definition, any legal opinion, Hutcherson included, amounts
to a legal meme.
In practice, the term legal meme bears a negative connotation
because it typically refers to (1) judicial errors, that (2) create
successive, rippling errors (namely, that spread). For instance, consider
the example offered by Michael Fried in his article, The Evolution of
Legal Concepts: The Memetic Perspective.44 A certain Supreme Court of
the United States case, United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,45
is routinely cited within the Court’s opinions to explain that the
“syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion and should not be treated as
authoritative.”46 The 1979 mislabeling of this opinion as simply United
States v. Detroit Lumber Co. “survived over thousands of subsequent
copyings,” going on to become the most frequently but wrongly cited
decision in the Supreme Court Reporter.47 As Mr. Fried puts it, the
41. 344 U.S. 1 (1952).
42. Michael S. Fried, The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic Perspective, 39
JURIMETRICS J. 291, 292 (1999).
43. Id.
44. Fried, supra note 42.
45. 200 U.S. 321 (1906).
46. Fried, supra note 41, at 302.
47. Id. at 303.
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episode provides an “insignificant [but] clear example of a basic
application of memetics to the legal system.”48 The Hutcherson opinion’s
mutual exclusivity fits the negative-connotation definition of a legal
meme, meaning a judicial error that has successfully spread.
In the previous subsection, the Authors described three errors from
which the Eleventh Circuit’s Hutcherson opinion may suffer, and the
Authors concluded that the likeliest error was error three, meaning a
judicial attempt to develop the law without sufficient explanation or
analysis offered in support. Now consider that this error by the
Hutcherson panel was unforced. That is, the plaintiff in Hutcherson
sought to stay his execution based on a core habeas claim: that
Alabama failed to provide adequate legal representation in capital
cases, requiring the federal habeas court “to vacate his conviction
and/or sentence on constitutional grounds (ineffective assistance of
counsel)[.]”49 Because this claim fell squarely within the core of
habeas—it directly challenged the lawfulness, rather than
circumstances, of custody—there was no cause for the Hutcherson panel
to address the penumbral overlap between habeas and § 1983. Strictly
speaking, therefore, Hutcherson’s discussion of mutual exclusivity was
dicta.
Given this fact, one might well ask: why does the Hutcherson opinion
matter? The answer is that a succession of subsequently published, and
hence binding, opinions have cited Hutcherson’s mutually exclusive
language as explaining the outcome in, for example, cases involving
procedural challenges to the clemency process (§ 1983),50 and methodof-execution challenges (generally, § 1983).51 A host of unpublished
decisions have similarly cited Hutcherson as explaining the outcome in
cases involving procedural challenges relating to parole requests under
§ 1983.52 Dicta or not, the Eleventh Circuit’s fifteen-year repetition of
Hutcherson’s rule of mutual exclusivity has caused that rule to become
entrenched.
Moreover, in at least one area, Hutcherson has yielded questionable
results. In Daker v. Warden,53 the Eleventh Circuit perceived an old
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decision—binding
upon the Eleventh Circuit54—as holding that requests for release from

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Hutcherson, 468 F.3d at 754.
See, e.g., Valle v. Sec’y, Fla. Dept. of Corrs., 654 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2011).
See, e.g., McNabb v. Comm’r Ala. Dept. of Corrs., 727 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2013).
See, e.g., Thomas v. McDonough, 228 F. App’x 931 (11th Cir. 2007).
805 F. App’x 648 (11th Cir. 2020).
See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 1981).
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administrative segregation may be raised in habeas.55 When paired
with Hutcherson, this Fifth Circuit holding compels the conclusion that
requests for release from administrative segregation must be raised in a
habeas action.
The result in Daker is questionable for two reasons. First, and as
discussed in subsequent sections, Daker is in tension with Supreme
Court precedent suggesting that prisoners may challenge
administrative segregation in a § 1983 action. Second, Daker is also in
tension with the Eleventh Circuit’s own description of the dividing line
between habeas and § 1983. Since prisoners seeking release from
administrative segregation will remain imprisoned regardless of
whether they succeed or fail, it is arguable that these prisoners are
challenging only the conditions, rather than the lawfulness, of their
custody. Hence, there is a strong analytical argument that under a
mutually exclusive paradigm, § 1983 should provide the exclusive cause
of action for challenges to administrative segregation.
Subsequent sections will revisit the problematic Daker case, but for
the present purpose, it is sufficient to note that (1) the Hutcherson
opinion is problematic in that its discussion of mutual exclusivity was
unnecessary dicta unsupported by sufficient explanation or analysis,
and that (2) fifteen years of subsequent Eleventh Circuit opinions have,
by reciting Hutcherson’s dicta, elevated that dicta to the status of a
binding rule that must be followed, even when it yields questionable
results.
There are, undoubtedly, many ways to criticize Hutcherson’s rippling
effect—one might, for example, validly criticize the Eleventh Circuit for
language fetishism or for lack of analytical rigor. Yet the criticism that
Hutcherson is a legal meme best describes what happened. Hutcherson
mutual exclusivity conquered messy penumbral overlap based on a
straightforward memetic principle: “a meme that is short, easily
remembered, and readily understood will likely beat out a more
cumbersome competitor in the contest for replication.”56
The Authors’ preemptive response to any legal meme criticism of
Hutcherson takes the form of an affirmative defense. There are
generally good reasons to be wary of legal memes, and critics are right
to expect that federal appellate courts ought to possess the wherewithal
to wrestle with analytical complexity. Yet the fact that Hutcherson is a
legal meme should not stymie an objective assessment of its rule. In the
following sections, the Authors argue that mutual exclusivity is
desirable because it gives clear guidance to litigants and lower courts
55. Krist v. Ricketts, 504 F.2d 887, 887–88 (5th Cir. 1974).
56. Fried, supra note 42, at 299–300.
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alike. Hence, even as the Authors agree that legal memes are generally
problematic, Hutcherson is something of a happy accident—if it is a
legal meme, it is a felicitous one.
III. MECHANICS: HOW DOES MUTUAL EXCLUSIVITY WORK?
It is firmly established that when a state prisoner challenges the fact
or duration of imprisonment and seeks an immediate or speedier
release from that imprisonment, she must do so in a habeas action.57
But the Supreme Court of the United States has not had an “occasion to
address the question whether § 1983 [is] the exclusive vehicle for claims
outside the core of habeas.”58 In Preiser, the Supreme Court stated in
dicta that habeas may be available to challenge prison conditions but
refused to “explore the appropriate limits of habeas corpus as an
alternative remedy to a proper action under § 1983.”59 Post-Preiser,
however, the Supreme Court has “suggest[ed] that § 1983 [is] the sole
remedy for” claims outside the core of habeas.60
Given the lack of guidance by the Court, it is not surprising that the
circuits do not agree on the overlap of habeas and § 1983. The Third,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all have held that
habeas and § 1983 are mutually exclusive.61 In these circuit courts, “a
57. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499.
58. Nettles, 830 F.3d at 929.
59. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499–500 (stating that “[w]hen a prisoner is put under
additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that
habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.”).
60. Nettles, 830 F.3d at 929; Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 n.1 (2004)
(stating that the “Court has never followed the speculation in Preiser . . . that . . . a
prisoner subject to ‘additional and unconstitutional restraint’ might have a habeas claim
independent of § 1983”) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499); But see also Ziglar v. Abbasi,
137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862–63 (2017) (noting that it is still an open question “whether
[prisoners] might be able to challenge their confinement conditions via a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.”).
61. Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540, 544 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that habeas and
§ 1983 “are not coextensive,” habeas is “clearly quite limited,” “[t]here is only a narrow
subset of actions that arguably might properly be brought as either, that is, where the
deprivation of rights is such that it necessarily impacts the fact or length of detention” but
“the Supreme Court has made it clear that for those cases . . . the habeas petition, is the
only available avenue of relief[,]” and state prisoner’s claim regarding placement in a
restricted activities program, which would not impact his release date, would “not be
properly brought under habeas at all”); Moran v. Sondalle, 218 F.3d 647, 650–51 (7th Cir.
2000) (holding that “[s]tate prisoners who want to challenge their convictions, their
sentences, or administrative orders revoking good-time credits or equivalent sentenceshortening devices, must seek habeas corpus,” and “prisoners who want to raise a
constitutional challenge to any other decision, such as transfer to a new prison,
administrative segregation, exclusion from prison programs, or suspension of privileges,
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suit that does not ‘seek[] a judgment at odds with [a prisoner’s]
conviction or . . . sentence’ may be brought only under section 1983.”62
In contrast, the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits have all
held, or stated in dicta, that some claims may be raised in habeas
although they do not attack a conviction or sentence and will not
necessarily result in a speedier release.63 The Fifth Circuit has taken
inconsistent positions regarding the issue.64
must instead employ § 1983”); Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 469–70 (8th Cir. 2014)
(holding prisoner’s claim that being put in four-point restraints for an extended period of
time violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment cannot
be brought in habeas); Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
habeas may be used only when the prisoner attacks the “validity of his sentence or the
length of his state custody” otherwise § 1983 must be used); Nettles, 830 F.3d at 927
(holding that § 2254 cannot be used to expunge a disciplinary violation that may, but will
not necessarily, accelerate a prisoner’s chances for parole); Palma Salazar v. Davis, 677
F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that federal prisoner could not challenge
conditions of confinement in a Section 2241 petition); Hutcherson, 468 F.3d at 754
(holding that habeas and § 1983 “are mutually exclusive: if a claim can be raised in a
federal habeas petition, that same claim cannot be raised in a separate § 1983 civil rights
action.”).
62. Nance v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 981 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2020), reh’g
denied, Nance v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 994 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2021), pet. for cert.
granted, 142 S. Ct. 858 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2022) (No. 21–439).
63. United States v. DeLeon, 444 F.3d 41, 59 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating in dicta that “[i]f
the conditions of incarceration raise Eighth Amendment concerns, habeas corpus is
available”); Thompson v. Choinski, 525 F.3d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating habeas
applies “to challenges to the execution of a federal sentence, ‘including such matters as
the administration of parole, . . . prison disciplinary actions, prison transfers, type of
detention and prison conditions’”); Roba v. United States, 604 F.2d 215, 219 n.4 (2d Cir.
1979) (stating in dicta that a conditions of confinement claim by state prisoner may be
brought under § 2254); Farabee v. Clarke, 967 F.3d 380, 395 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding that
the substantive due process claim that prison officials used medication and solitary
confinement to treat prisoner’s mental illness and behavioral issues could proceed in
habeas ); In re Campbell, 874 F.3d 454, 464 (6th Cir. 2017) (overruling precedent to the
extent that it held method-of-execution claims could be raised in habeas or § 1983 but
stating that “§ 1983 and habeas are not mutually exclusive as a per se rule”); Terrell v.
United States, 564 F.3d 442, 447–49 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that a federal prisoner could
raise procedural challenge to parole process in a § 2241 petition even though success
would not necessarily mean earlier release); But see Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714
(6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the district court should have dismissed habeas petition
requesting transfer to receive medical treatment so prisoner could re-file as a § 1983
action); Hudson v. Hardy, 424 F.2d 854, 855 n.3, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that
prisoner complaints of “disciplinary restrictions,” were properly raised in habeas because
“[h]abeas corpus tests not only the fact but also the form of detention.”).
64. Poree v. Collins, 866 F.3d 235, 243–44 (5th Cir. 2017) (recognizing the Circuit’s
inconsistent position regarding the mutual exclusivity of § 1983 and habeas); Compare
Coleman v. Dretke, 409 F.3d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating in dicta that § 1983 is not
the “exclusive avenue by which to attack conditions of confinement”), with Carson v.
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The Circuits that consider habeas and § 1983 mutually exclusive
[C]onsider[] the claims the Supreme Court held must be brought as
habeas actions pursuant to the Preiser line of cases . . . as coextensive
with the claims that can be brought under habeas in its totality. In
other words, there are no ‘suits outside of the core habeas claims
identified in Preiser,’ . . . for which jurisdiction might overlap with
§ 1983.65

This approach has the potential to offer significant benefits, including
curtailing abusive prisoner litigation, providing more efficient
resolution of claims, and promoting clarity and ease of administration.
As stated previously, Congress enacted the PLRA, in part, to “curtail
abusive prisoner litigation.”66 Due to several restrictions in the PLRA,
requiring prisoners to raise claims involving all aspects of “prison life”
under § 1983 furthers this goal.67 These restrictions include the
requirements that (1) administrative remedies be exhausted before
filing suit;68 (2) prisoners pay the full filing fee even when allowed to
proceed in forma pauperis;69 and, (3) with limited exceptions, prepayment of the full filing fee if the prisoner has had three previous civil
actions dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim.70
If a prisoner could avoid these requirements by bringing conditions of
confinement claims in a habeas action, Congress’ goal of curtailing
abusive prisoner litigation would be thwarted.
The administrative grievance procedure, which prisoners must
exhaust for all “action[s] . . . brought with respect to prison conditions,”
is better suited than the courts to address prisoners’ conditions of
confinement complaints.71 Exhaustion allows prison officials to take
corrective action in a speedy and efficient manner, without resorting to

Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820–21 (5th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that the Fifth Circuit has
at times “adopted a simple, bright-line rule” that all claims for which “‘a favorable
determination . . . would not automatically entitle [the prisoner] to accelerated release,’”
must be raised in a § 1983 action and holding that prisoner’s claims regarding placement
in segregation must be raised in a § 1983 action) (alteration in original), and Cook v.
Hanberry, 592 F.2d 248, 249 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that “[h]abeas corpus is not available
to prisoners complaining only of mistreatment during their legal incarceration.”).
65. Terrell, 564 F.3d at 448.
66. Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002).
67. Nettles, 830 F.3d at 932.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (1996).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (1996).
71. 28 U.S.C. 1997e(a); see Porter, 534 U.S. at 525.
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the courts.72 “And for cases ultimately brought to court, adjudication
could be facilitated by an administrative record that clarifies the
contours of the controversy.”73 Thus, requiring all suits regarding prison
conditions (except those at the core of habeas) to proceed through § 1983
results in more efficient resolution of claims.74
Mutual exclusivity between habeas and § 1983 provides much needed
clarity for the parties and the district courts.75 Both prisoners and
courts should find it easier to follow a bright line rule—only core of
habeas claims (those for which success will “necessarily lead to
immediate or speedier release”) can be brought in habeas—versus a
rule that requires a “probabilistic analysis” to determine under which
cause of action to bring a claim.76 Prisoners are more likely to know the
necessary steps to take before filing suit,77 and less likely to suffer
negative consequences from filing the wrong type of suit.78 Mutual
exclusivity allows the district court to determine the proper cause of
action and process cases accordingly more easily. The only inquiry the
court must make is whether the claim, if successful, would necessarily
shorten a prisoner’s length of confinement.79 If so, the claim must be
raised in habeas and if not, it must be raised in § 1983.80 The courts are
not required to engage in an analysis of just how likely it might be that
the plaintiff will receive an immediate or earlier release if successful.
As the Ninth Circuit stated in Nettles, when habeas and § 1983 are
mutually exclusive, district courts are “not require[d] . . . to guess at the

72. Porter, 534 U.S. at 525.
73. Id.
74. Nettles, 830 F.3d at 933.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 934.
77. Prisoners filing a § 1983 complaint must exhaust available administrative
remedies before filing suit while those filing a habeas petition must exhaust by giving the
state’s highest court a chance to rule on all claims. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,
844–45 (1999); Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1156 (11th Cir. 2010). Failure to take the
appropriate steps to exhaust will result in dismissal.
78. Filing under the wrong cause of action can have financial consequences.
Specifically, a prisoner who requests and is allowed to proceed without prepayment of the
filing fee, is still required to pay the full $350.00 when proceeding under § 1983. This is
true even if the complaint is summarily dismissed because the prisoner filed under § 1983
when she should have filed under habeas. Additionally, a prisoner may be barred from
seeking relief on claims not properly raised. For example, a prisoner who fails to raise a
claim in her first habeas petition because she mistakenly believes it can be raised in a
later § 1983, may be barred from filing a second or successive habeas petition to raise the
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1996).
79. O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844.
80. Nettles, 830 F.3d at 931.
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discretionary decisions of state officials in order to determine whether
an action sounds in habeas or § 1983, and which prerequisites must be
met.”81
The clarity offered by mutual exclusivity is demonstrated in cases
involving challenges to parole procedures. The circuits that employ the
Hutcherson approach agree that when a prisoner challenges the
procedure of a parole hearing and success would, at most, mean a new
or speedier review of a parole petition or parole hearing, his challenge
must be raised in under § 1983. If, however, a prisoner attacks the
outcome of a parole hearing, seeks to overturn the results of that
hearing, and receives immediate or earlier release, the challenge must
be raised in habeas.
But it can “sometimes [be] difficult to draw the line between claims
that are properly brought in habeas and those that may be brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”82 This is demonstrated by both method-ofexecution challenges and requests for release from administrative
segregation. For example, the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision in
Nance v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections, holding
that certain method-of-execution claims must be brought under habeas,
is directly at odds with the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit’s opinion in In re Campbell,83 holding that method-of-execution
claims must be brought under § 1983.84 Regarding requests for release
from administrative segregation, the Eleventh Circuit’s recent
unpublished Daker opinion is at odds with other circuits that have
found such claims must be raised in § 1983. Additionally, Daker is at
odds with the Eleventh Circuit’s own precedent. Despite the Eleventh
Circuit’s determination that habeas and § 1983 are mutually exclusive,
it currently allows requests for release from administrative segregation
to proceed under both habeas and § 1983.
A. Challenges to Parole Procedures
In Wilkinson v Dotson,85 two prisoners brought § 1983 lawsuits
challenging Ohio’s parole procedures as unconstitutional. The prisoners
sought new parole hearings. The Respondent argued that the
“prisoners’ lawsuits . . . attack the duration of their confinement,” so
their claims “may only be brought through a habeas corpus action, not

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 934.
DA’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 76 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring).
874 F.3d 454, 464 (6th Cir. 2017).
Nance, 981 F.3d at 1206, 1212.
544 U.S. 74 (2005).
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through § 1983.”86 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that success
for the prisoners would, at most, mean a new or speedier review of
parole petitions or parole hearings.87 “Because neither prisoner’s claim
would necessarily spell speedier release,” the Court concluded that the
“actions may be brought under § 1983.”88 The Court, however, did “not
seem to deny that [a challenge to parole procedures] indeed could be
cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings.”89
Circuits employing the Hutcherson approach, however, have held
that when a prisoner challenges parole procedures and requests a new
parole hearing or review of a parole petition, he must proceed under
§ 1983.90 Thus, mutual exclusivity has provided clarity with respect to
parole procedure challenges. The Wilkinson framework provides that if
success on a challenge to parole procedures means only a new parole
hearing or new review of a parole petition at which the state
“authorities may, in their discretion, decline to shorten [the] prison
term,” the action may be raised in § 1983.91 Conversely, if success on a
challenge to the outcome of a parole hearing or petition means the
parole board has no discretion to deny immediate or speedier release,
the challenge must be raised in a habeas petition.92 For circuits
employing the Hutcherson approach, this framework has been turned
into a bright-line rule: challenges to parole procedures that may be
raised under § 1983, must be raised under § 1983, while challenges that
seek to nullify a parole board’s decision and obtain immediate release
must be raised under habeas. This bright-line rule enables prisoners or

86. Id. at 78.
87. Id. at 82.
88. Id. at 76, 82.
89. Id. at 89 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
90. Nettles, 830 F.3d at 934–35; Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 819 (5th Cir. 1997);
Cook v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice Transitional Planning Dep’t, 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th
Cir. 1994) (holding that claims attacking the parole process “that would merely enhance
eligibility for accelerated release” must proceed through § 1983 while “those that would
create entitlement to such relief” must proceed through habeas); Kerlin v. Barnard, 742 F.
App’x 488, 489 (11th Cir. 2018); Miller v. Nix, 346 F. App’x 422, 423 (11th Cir. 2009)
(holding district court properly dismissed habeas petition in which prisoner complained of
parole process and sought new parole hearing because action cognizable only in § 1983);
Flemings v. Covello, No. 19-cv-0944-JAH-AGS, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 38512, at *1 (S.D. Cal.
Mar. 5, 2020). If, however, a prisoner seeks to nullify the parole board’s decision and
“seeks an injunction ordering . . . immediate or speedier release into the community,” his
action would need to proceed through habeas. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82; Coady v.
Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485–86 (3d Cir. 2001); Dimmick v. Bourdon, 769 F. App’x 616,
618–20 (10th Cir. 2019).
91. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82.
92. See id.; Dimmick, 769 F. App’x at 620.
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their lawyers to file the appropriate action and allows district courts to
easily classify and process the actions that are filed.
B. Method-of-Execution Challenges
“The Supreme Court has never held that a challenge to a method of
execution was not cognizable as a complaint under § 1983.”93 But it has
specifically declined to “reach . . . the difficult question of how to
categorize method-of-execution claims.”94 Instead, it has recognized that
such claims “fall at the margins of habeas.”95 The test for whether a
method-of-execution claim must be raised in habeas is whether success
on the claim would “necessarily prevent [the State] from carrying out its
execution.”96 Generally, when “an inmate . . . challenges . . . the means
by which the State intends to execute him,” success will not prevent the
State from carrying out the execution by some other means.97 These
claims, therefore, either can or, in States where habeas and § 1983 are
mutually exclusive, must be brought under § 1983.98
Currently, only the Eleventh Circuit holds that a method-ofexecution challenge must, in some situations, be raised in habeas.99
This holding is based almost exclusively on dicta from three Supreme
Court cases: Nelson v. Campbell,100 Hill v. McDonough,101 and Bucklew
v. Precythe.102 Ironically, the Sixth Circuit, which has found “§ 1983 and
habeas are not mutually exclusive as a per se rule,” holds that methodof-execution challenges can never be raised in habeas.103 To understand
how the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits arrived at these differing
positions, it is necessary to review the procedural and substantive
development of method-of-execution challenges through the Supreme
Court.
In Nelson v. Campbell, a death row inmate filed a § 1983 action
seeking, inter alia, to permanently enjoin the use of a “cut down”

93. Nance, 981 F.3d at 1206.
94. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644 (2004).
95. Id. at 646.
96. Id. at 647.
97. McNabb, 727 F.3d at 1344.
98. Id. (holding prisoner’s claim that “an ineffective first drug or improper
administration of a first drug in a three-drug protocol would violate the [C]onstitution”
was improperly brought in a habeas petition).
99. Nance, 981 F.3d at 1209.
100. 541 U.S. at 646.
101. 547 U.S. 573, 583 (2006).
102. 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1128 (2019); Nance, 981 F.3d at 1203, 1206–07.
103. In re Campbell, 874 F.3d at 464.
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procedure to access his severely compromised veins.104 The Eleventh
Circuit found the district court correctly construed the action as a
habeas petition and dismissed the petition as second or successive.105
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that success on the prisoners
Eighth Amendment claim would not necessarily prevent Alabama from
executing him.106 The cut-down procedure was not statutorily mandated
and there were alternatives that could be used to carry out the
execution.107 Thus, the claim could be raised in § 1983. In dicta,
however, the Court indicated that there may be instances in which a
claim must be raised in habeas, for example, “a constitutional challenge
seeking to permanently enjoin the use of lethal injection may amount to
a challenge to the fact of the sentence itself” if the state law required
the use of lethal injection.108
In Hill v. McDonough, a death row inmate filed a § 1983 complaint
seeking to enjoin the three-drug lethal injection sequence Florida likely
would use to execute him.109 Just as it had in Nelson, the Eleventh
Circuit found the district court correctly construed the complaint as a
habeas petition and dismissed the action as second or successive.110
Again, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the case was controlled by
Nelson.111 If successful, the State would not necessarily be prevented
from using lethal injection to execute the prisoner.112 The prisoner
acknowledged there were alternative methods of lethal injection that
would be constitutional, the State did not argue that an injunction
would leave it with no way to execute the inmate, and State law did not
require use of the challenged procedure.113 Thus, the claim could be
brought under § 1983. As it did in Nelson, the Court stated in dicta that
if the relief sought under § 1983 would “foreclose the State from
implementing the [inmate’s] sentence under present law,” then
“recharacterizing a complaint as an action for habeas corpus might be
proper.”114

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

541 U.S. at 639.
Id. at 642–43.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 644–45.
Id. at 644.
547 U.S. at 578.
Id.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 580–81.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 582–83.
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The substantive requirements for a successful method-of-execution
challenge are set out in Baze v. Rees,115 and Glossip v. Gloss.116 The
prisoner must “establish that the method presents a risk that is sure or
very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering, and give rise
to sufficiently imminent dangers.”117 He must also identify an
alternative method of execution.118 The Baze-Glossip test requires a
prisoner present “a feasible and readily implemented alternative
method of execution that would significantly reduce a substantial risk
of severe pain and that the State has refused to adopt without a
legitimate penological reason.”119
In Bucklew v. Precythe, the issue was whether a prisoner bringing an
as-applied, as opposed to a facial, Eighth Amendment method-ofexecution challenge in a § 1983 action must satisfy the Baze-Glossip
test.120 The Court held that he must and clarified that when “seeking to
identify an alternative method of execution” the prisoner “is not limited
to choosing among those presently authorized by a particular State’s
law.”121 Instead, he “may point to a well-established protocol in another
State as a potentially viable option.”122 In dicta, the Court stated that
[E]xisting state law might be relevant to determining the proper
procedural vehicle for the inmate’s claim. See Hill v. McDonough, 547
U.S. 573, 582–583, 126 S. Ct. 2096, 165 L. Ed. 2d 44 (2006) (if the
relief sought in a 42 U. S. C. § 1983 action would “foreclose the State
from implementing the [inmate’s] sentence under present law,” then
“recharacterizing a complaint as an action for habeas corpus might
be proper”).123

Relying almost entirely on this dicta and explanatory parenthetical,
the Eleventh Circuit recently held that “[a] complaint seeking an
injunction against the only method of execution authorized in a state
must be brought in a habeas petition, because such an injunction
necessarily implies the invalidity of the prisoner’s death sentence.”124 In
Nance, the prisoner filed a § 1983 complaint alleging that “Georgia’s

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

553 U.S. 35 (2008).
576 U.S. 863 (2015).
Id. at 877.
Baze, 553 U.S. at 52.
Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1125.
Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1128.
Id.
Id. (citing Hill, 547 U.S. at 582–83).
Nance, 981 F.3d at 1209.
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lethal-injection protocol, as applied to his unique medical situation,
violates the Eighth Amendment and that the firing squad is a readily
available alternative.”125 Lethal injection is, however, the only method
of execution allowed by Georgia law.126 Thus, according to the Eleventh
Circuit, the prisoner sought to bar Georgia from executing him by any
available method and such a claim must be raised in habeas.127 Just as
it did in Nelson and Hill, the court found the § 1983 complaint should
be construed as a habeas petition and dismissed as second or
successive.128
The Sixth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, holding that all
method-of-execution claims must be raised exclusively in § 1983.129 The
court reasoned that “a death-penalty challenge is not cognizable in
habeas unless a defect impairs the very fact of the death sentence
itself.”130 Only when a prisoner asserts that all available means of
execution are unconstitutional would the death penalty be rendered
“void and unenforceable.”131 Thus, only when a prisoner asserts there
are no alternative means of execution can he raise a method-ofexecution challenge in habeas.132 But in Glossip, the Supreme Court
held that a prisoner bringing a method of execution challenge, “has no
claim unless he can identify a constitutional means by which he can be
executed.”133 There is, therefore, no way for a prisoner challenging his
method of execution to maintain all means of execution are
unconstitutional, which is the only claim that could be raised in a
habeas petition. According to the Sixth Circuit, with Glossip, the
Supreme Court “close[d] the final path into habeas court.”134
In an unpublished decision with facts indistinguishable from those in
Nance, the Sixth Circuit held that Bucklew in no way impacted its
holding in Campbell.135 Smith, like Nance, maintained that “his unique
characteristics are such that he can never be executed in a
constitutionally valid manner” by lethal injection and State law allowed

125.
126.
127.
128.
439).
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 1203.
Id.
Id. at 1209.
Id. at 1211–14 (pet. for cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 858, (U.S. Jan. 14, 2022) (No. 21–
In re Campbell, 874 F.3d at 464.
Id. at 462.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Smith, 806 F. App’x 462, 464–65 (6th Cir. 2020).
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only for lethal injection.136 Unlike Nance, Smith raised the challenge in
a habeas petition, arguing that Bucklew abrogated Campbell.137 Relying
on the same dicta on which the Eleventh Circuit relied in Nance, Smith
argued that “Bucklew abrogated Campbell and permits his challenges
to the lethal-injection method to be raised in [a] habeas petition[].”138
The Sixth Circuit disagreed, explaining that “[w]hether an as-applied
method-of-execution claim may be brought in habeas is not implicated
by the question presented in Bucklew, its holding, or its primary legal
reasoning.”139 The Sixth Circuit refused to find “that the parenthetical,
combined with the [Supreme] Court’s statement that the question of
state law ‘might be relevant to determining the proper procedural
vehicle for the inmate’s claim,’ meaningfully alter[ed] the analysis in
Campbell.”140
The Eleventh and Sixth Circuits have, therefore, taken diametrically
opposed positions. In the Eleventh Circuit, a method-of-execution
challenge that proposes an unauthorized alternative execution method,
must be raised in habeas.141 Meanwhile, in the Sixth Circuit, the same
claim must be raised in a § 1983 action.142 After Nance, some method-ofexecution challenges in the Eleventh Circuit must now be brought
under § 1983, while others must be brought under habeas.143 Given
this, there is concern that Nance may “generate confusion in [the
Eleventh] [C]ircuit about how to bring method-of-execution claims.”144
C. Challenges to Administrative Segregation
When a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his custody
and seeks immediate or speedier release, he must proceed through
habeas.145 Thus, when a prisoner loses good-conduct-time credits or
other sentence shortening devices following a disciplinary proceeding,
he must seek restoration of those through habeas.146 Unlike loss of
136. Id. at 463.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 464.
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1128).
141. Nance, 981 F.3d at 1209.
142. Campbell, 874 F.3d at 464.
143. Compare McNabb, 727 F.3d at 1344, with Nance, 981 F.3d at 1209.
144. Nance v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 994 F.3d 1335, 1340 (2021) (Martin, J.,
dissenting from the denial of cert.).
145. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489–90.
146. Id.; Additionally, a prisoner who loses good-time credits and seeks damages or a
declaration that the disciplinary procedures violated due process may not proceed under
§ 1983 unless he can show that the disciplinary finding has been invalidated. Edwards v.
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good-conduct-time credits, however, placement in administrative
segregation following a disciplinary proceeding does not change the fact
or length of confinement, it changes the prisoner’s conditions of
confinement.147 Generally, a prisoner challenging the conditions of his
confinement must seek relief under § 1983.148 But confinement in
administrative segregation seems to resist easy classification into these
discrete categories. As is shown below, requests for release from
administrative segregation seem to have evolved from habeas to § 1983
over time. In the Eleventh Circuit, however, this evolution has not been
linear, and currently a prisoner seeking release from administrative
segregation may proceed under either § 1983 or habeas.
In Sandin v. Conner,149 an inmate placed in administrative
segregation filed a § 1983 action seeking removal of the misconduct
charge from his prison record on the grounds that his due-process rights
were violated during the disciplinary proceedings.150 The Supreme
Court did not discuss whether the claim was properly brought under
§ 1983.151 It did, however, address the claim and held there was no
liberty interest protecting against a thirty-day assignment to
segregated confinement because it did not “present a dramatic
departure from the basic conditions of [the inmate’s] sentence.”152
In Wilkinson v. Austin,153 inmates sought declaratory and injunctive
relief in a § 1983 suit, alleging Ohio’s policies for placement and
retention in its highest security prison, known as a “Supermax” prison

Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–89 (1994). In
other words, Heck’s “favorable termination requirement” applies in such situation.
Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 755; Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81–82 (stating that “a state
prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)–no matter the relief sought
(damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct
leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)–if success in that action would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration”); Edwards, 520
U.S. at 646–47.
147. Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 754–55.
148. The Supreme Court has held that Heck’s “favorable termination requirement”
does not bar a § 1983 suit for damages related to disciplinary proceedings that resulted in
placement or retention in administrative segregation. Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 754–55
(stating that if the disciplinary proceedings did not “affect the duration of time to be
served . . . . [a] § 1983 suit challenging [the proceedings] could not . . . be construed as
seeking a judgment at odds with [the prisoner’s] conviction or with the State’s calculation
of time to be served in accordance with the underlying sentence.”).
149. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
150. Id. at 475–77.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 485.
153. 545 U.S. 209 (2005).
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(OSP), violated due process.154 On the eve of trial, Ohio promulgated
new regulations to be followed in the future for placement and retention
in OSP.155 As in Sandin, the Supreme Court did not address the
cognizability of the claim under § 1983 but did reach the merits of the
claim.156 The Court held that prisoners had a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in avoiding assignment at OSP because such an
assignment, “‘imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’”157 The Court found
that Ohio’s newly adopted procedures were sufficient to satisfy the Due
Process Clause.158
After Sandin and Wilkinson, it would seem that circuits holding
habeas and § 1983 mutually exclusive would find that challenges to
administrative segregation must be raised in a § 1983 action. In other
words, the Supreme Court allowed a challenge to administrative
segregation and placement in a restrictive supermax prison to be
brought under § 1983 and if an action may be brought under § 1983, it
must be brought under § 1983.
The Eleventh Circuit, however, found that while the Supreme Court
allowed the procedural due process claim in Sandin to proceed under
§ 1983, it did not “address the cognizability of such claims in those
proceedings.”159 Thus, according to the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme
Court merely “suggested that such claims might not be cognizable in a
habeas proceeding,” which did not overrule the circuit’s precedent that
challenges to administrative segregation “may proceed in a habeas
petition.”160 Interestingly, the court did not state that the claim must
proceed through habeas, which would be consistent with the
Hutcherson approach, it stated only that the claim may proceed through
habeas.161
In Krist v. Ricketts,162 the precedent to which the Eleventh Circuit
refers, the former Fifth Circuit found that the district court erred in reconstruing a prisoner’s habeas petition as a § 1983 action when the

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 218.
Id.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 223–24 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484).
Id. at 228.
Daker, 805 F. App’x at 650 (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477–87).
Id. at 650.
Id.
504 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1974).
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prisoner sought release from administrative segregation.163 The court
held:
[H]abeas corpus [is] available to persons who seek release from
solitary confinement within the context of general incarceration . . . .
Such release falls into the category of ‘fact or duration of . . . physical
imprisonment’ delineated in Preiser . . . and reserved for habeas
jurisdiction.164

Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s language in Daker that a request for
release from administrative confinement “may proceed in a habeas
petition,” Krist held that such a request must proceed in a habeas
petition.165
The Eleventh Circuit has not always found itself bound by Krist.
Despite its insistence that habeas and § 1983 are mutually exclusive, it
has allowed prisoners seeking release from administrative segregation
to proceed under both causes of action.166
While the Fifth Circuit has not explicitly overruled Krist, it has
changed its position and, unlike the Eleventh Circuit, now finds that
challenges to administrative segregation must be raised under § 1983.
In Carson v. Johnson,167 a prisoner, proceeding in forma pauperis, filed
a habeas petition in which he alleged that his placement and retention
in administrative segregation violated the Constitution and rendered
him ineligible for parole. The district court construed the habeas
petition as a § 1983 complaint and dismissed it because the prisoner
had accrued three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).168 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit recognized that the distinction between habeas and § 1983

163. Id. at 888.
164. Id. at 887–88 (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498–99).
165. Daker, 805 F. App’x at 650.
166. Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1987) (inmate’s due process
challenge to administrative segregation allowed to proceed under § 2254); McKinnis v.
Mosely, 693 F.2d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that “[a]lthough there may well be
an ‘ambiguous borderland’ between habeas corpus and section 1983, . . . we have no
difficulty in concluding that” a case in which the prisoner alleges denial of due process in
connection with his placement in administrative segregation and seeks damages, transfer,
and expungement of record, “falls within the territory governed by section 1983”);
Quintilla v. Bryson, 730 F. App’x 738, 745 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that prisoner stated
plausible claims in his § 1983 complaint, in which he sought damages and injunctive relief
based on his years-long confinement in Tier II segregation); Al Amin v. Donald, 165 F.
App’x 733, 734 (11th Cir. 2006) (addressing on the merits a § 1983 complaint in which
prisoner sought damages and release from administrative segregation).
167. 112 F.3d 818 (5th Cir. 1997).
168. Id. at 819.
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can be “blurry” in these situations.169 It had, however, “adopted a
simple, bright-line rule for resolving such questions. If a favorable
determination . . . would not automatically entitle [the prisoner] to
accelerated release, the proper vehicle is a § 1983.”170 The Court
explained that while removal from administrative segregation would
make the prisoner eligible for parole consideration, it would not
automatically shorten his sentence or lead to immediate release.171
Thus, relief could not be sought through habeas.172
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
previously cited Krist to support its holding that “habeas corpus can be
used to get from a more to a less restrictive custody.”173 Years later, the
court expressed doubt that habeas was the appropriate cause of action
when a prisoner “contends that his custody should take one form (the
prison’s general population) rather than another (segregation).”174
Finally, in Montgomery v. Anderson,175 the Seventh Circuit reversed the
position it had taken in McCollum,176 finding that “more-restrictive
custody must be challenged under § 1983.”177
The Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that prisoners
seeking release from administrative confinement must proceed through
§ 1983.178 The Eight Circuit has stated in dicta that “prisoners who

169. Id. at 820.
170. Id. at 820–21.
171. Id. at 821.
172. Id.; See also Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612 (5th Cir. 1996) (addressing on the
merits an action brought under § 1983 in which prisoner alleged retention in
administrative segregation violated due process rights); Johnson v. Thaler, No. 2:10-cv141, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 24581, at *5–6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2012) (dismissing habeas in
which prisoner sought release from administrative segregation because the district court
was bound by “bright line rule” established in Carson as opposed to Krist).
173. McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044, 1046 (7th Cir. 1982); Graham v. Broglin, 922
F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating in dicta that if the prisoner seeks “the run of the
prison in contrast to the approximation to solitary confinement that is disciplinary
segregation—then habeas corpus is his remedy.”).
174. Sylvester v. Hanks, 140 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1998).
175. 262 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 2001).
176. The Court did not expressly overrule McCollum.
177. Montgomery, 262 F.3d at 644; See also Moran, 218 F.3d at 651 (stating in dicta
that “[s]tate prisoners who want to raise a constitutional challenge to . . . administrative
segregation . . . must . . . employ § 1983.”).
178. Leamer, 288 F.3d at 544 (holding that prisoner’s challenge to placement in the
close custody unit and restrictive activities program “would not be properly brought under
habeas[,]” but must proceed through § 1983); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th
Cir. 2003) (holding “that habeas jurisdiction is absent, and a § 1983 action proper” when a
prisoner challenges segregation because “a successful challenge . . . will not necessarily
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challenge disciplinary rulings that do not lengthen their sentence are
probably outside the habeas statute[.]”179
Thus, most of the circuits that employ the Hutcherson approach find
that challenges to and requests for removal from administrative
segregation must be brought under § 1983. The Eleventh Circuit
appears to be the outlier on this issue. Perhaps this difference of
opinion is not surprising because the issue is capable of two sound
conceptualizations. On the one hand, since release from administrative
segregation does not mean release from prison altogether, one could
reasonably characterize a request for release from segregation as
challenging only the conditions or circumstances of confinement, rather
than the lawfulness or duration of confinement. By this
conceptualization, § 1983 is the appropriate vehicle. On the other hand,
one could reasonably view administrative segregation as a distinct type
of custody-within-custody, and of course, habeas is the appropriate
vehicle for requesting a release from custody. This latter view, though,
may be in tension with Supreme Court cases like Sandin and
Wilkinson, which appear to contemplate the adjudication of
administrative segregation claims within § 1983 actions.
As is shown by the circuit courts’ handling of method-of-execution
challenges and requests for release from administrative segregation,
classification as habeas versus § 1983 can be problematic. Given the
difficulty of drawing lines between claims that are properly raised in
habeas and those that may be brought under § 1983, one might
legitimately question the value of the Hutcherson approach. As
discussed below, mutual exclusivity has its problems. It, however, offers
the most efficient structure for processing the ever-increasing volume of
prisoner litigation.
IV. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS: WILL MUTUAL EXCLUSIVITY REALLY WORK?
The Federal Reporter suggests that the circuit courts are now
adopting mutual exclusivity without fear of the abstract criticisms
raised in part two of this Article. Again, mutual exclusivity means a
clear division between habeas and § 1983 along the following lines:
When an inmate challenges the circumstances of his confinement but
not the validity of his conviction and/or sentence, then the claim is
properly raised in a civil rights action under § 1983. However, when
an inmate raises any challenge to the lawfulness of confinement or

shorten the prisoner’s sentence”); Gee v. Murphy, 325 F. App’x 666, 670 (10th Cir. 2009)
(holding that challenge to administrative segregation may not be brought under habeas).
179. Sheldon v. Hundley, 83 F.3d 231, 234 (8th Cir. 1996).
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the particulars affecting its duration, his claim falls solely within the
province of habeas corpus under § 2254.180

As discussed in section three, the courts are currently laboring to
categorize liminal claims as implicating either habeas or § 1983. That
is, the courts are laboring to explain how mutual exclusivity works,
including in the hard cases. In this section, the Authors consider
whether that project is achievable. Addressed below are four practical
problems that the courts will encounter in their work. Notwithstanding
these problems, the Authors believe that mutual exclusivity offers a
viable framework for prison litigation.
A. Circuit Splits and Supreme Court Tension
Mutual exclusivity is not a magic bullet, and it will not dispel
analytical hardship arising from liminal issues that fall midway
between the core of habeas and the core of § 1983. Yet it is helpful to
distinguish between two types of liminal problems: (1) those arising
from a remedy (addressed below, in subsection (C)), and (2) those
arising from category choice—that is, from the judicial decision about
which “bucket,” habeas or § 1983, in which to place a certain type of
claim.
Regarding the latter problem of category choice, the courts will face
two interrelated difficulties. First, courts may reach different
conclusions or “split” about whether to categorize a particular claim as
sounding in habeas or § 1983. Second, court categorizations under a
mutually exclusive paradigm might create tension with Supreme Court
precedent, which historically has preserved the possibility of overlap
between habeas and § 1983. Both difficulties can be demonstrated by
revisiting the topic of administrative segregation.
As described in section three, a federal circuit split already exists
over what category, habeas or § 1983, should encompass requests for
release from administrative segregation. Of those circuits employing
mutual exclusivity, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have consistently held
that administrative segregation claims must be raised under § 1983.181
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have flip-flopped, such that both
Circuits now also fall into the § 1983 camp.182 At present, only the

180. Hutcherson, 468 F.3d at 754.
181. See Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 859; Gee, 325 F. App’x at 670.
182. See Carson, 112 F.3d at 821; Montgomery, 262 F.3d at 644.
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Eleventh Circuit may require183 litigants to seek release from
administrative segregation exclusively in a § 2254 action.184
The current makeup of this split could, of course, change as other
circuits adopt mutual exclusivity and begin to make category choices.
The Authors predict that new circuits will adopt the majority position,
making the Eleventh Circuit an increasing outlier on the issue of
administrative segregation. The weight of consensus partly justifies this
prediction,185 but undoubtedly, new circuits will also seek to avoid
tension with Supreme Court precedent.
Regarding that topic, a handful of Supreme Court decisions have
analyzed the propriety of procedures accompanying a prisoner’s
transfer to harsher “segregation” quarters, and all of those decisions
invoked § 1983. Sandin v. Connor is the posterchild, but there are other
cases too—Wilkinson v. Austin, Hewitt v. Helms,186 and Hughes v.
Rowe187 are examples. These cases suggest that the Eleventh Circuit’s
position on administrative segregation is tenuous, either because
mutual exclusivity is itself improper, or because administrative
segregation claims should be raised under § 1983. The Eleventh
Circuit’s response to this apparent tension is bold indeed: the Eleventh
Circuit contends that the Supreme Court labored in its past cases
without pausing to “address the cognizability of such claims in [§ 1983]
proceedings.”188
What is the general takeaway from these specific administrative
segregation examples? The Authors believe the takeaway should be
that circuit splits and precedential tension are ordinary incidents of
litigation in difficult areas of law. These problems, in other words, are
not specific to mutual exclusivity, and they should not forestall an
adoption, by new circuits, of a mutually exclusive paradigm. Ensuing
problems, such as those described above, will resolve themselves in time
by time-tested means. For example, if the Eleventh Circuit ruled
incorrectly in Daker, then a correction will soon arrive in one form or
another. A new Eleventh Circuit panel could disclaim Daker as
unpublished, and hence non-binding. Or the Eleventh Circuit might sit
183. As discussed in part three, the Daker case is itself inconsistent with earlier
Eleventh Circuit caselaw. See, e.g., Al-Amin, 165 F. App’x at 735–36 (entertaining a
request for “removal from administrative segregation” in a § 1983 action).
184. See Daker, 805 F. App’x at 650.
185. See Stephen L. Wasby, Intercircuit Conflicts in the Courts of Appeals, 63 MONT. L.
REV. 119, 160 (2002) (“[w]hen a conflict exists and more courts of appeals have adopted
one of the competing positions, there may be a pull from the majority position.”).
186. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
187. 449 U.S. 5 (1980).
188. Daker, 805 F. App’x at 650.
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en banc to revise Krist v. Ricketts, the old Fifth Circuit decision
underlying Daker.
It is also possible that the Supreme Court could intercede to declare
that requests for release from administrative segregation are cognizable
in § 1983 actions. Such intercession, though, is unlikely, and hence it is
not a ready source for clarity. The better prospect is for the circuit
courts to forge ahead by adopting Hutcherson mutual exclusivity, and
by continuing to make and revise category choices, including in difficult,
liminal areas of law.
B. State Court Application
Federal courts lack exclusive jurisdiction over § 1983 actions, so
plaintiffs may opt to bring their § 1983 actions in state court. If a
plaintiff makes this choice, should the presiding state court apply
Hutcherson’s rule of mutual exclusivity? If so, should the state court
also track regional federal court category choices (that is, what claims
fall into which “bucket”)?
The Authors will not long dwell on these difficult forum shopping
questions except to offer three brief observations. First, the more one
associates Hutcherson mutual exclusivity with Congressional intent
divined from AEDPA and the PLRA, the likelier one is to conclude that
the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to apply mutual exclusivity
under the reverse-Erie doctrine.189 In other words, a given jurist’s
answers to the above questions are likely to be contingent upon that
jurist’s jurisprudential understanding of the origin of Hutcherson
mutual exclusivity.
Second, as a descriptive matter, some state courts are, at present,
implicitly declining to follow federal circuit adoptions of a mutually
exclusive paradigm. For example, the Tenth Circuit has adopted mutual
exclusivity.190 Yet within the Tenth Circuit’s territorial ambit, Kansas
state courts continue to entertain requests for release from
administrative segregation in habeas actions, Jamerson v.
Heimgartner,191 and in § 1983 actions.192 This seeming incongruity is
reconcilable, even in theory: reverse-Erie doctrine asks state courts to
“try to determine what the U.S. Supreme Court would rule,”193 and

189. Reverse-Erie refers to the process by which “federal law flows down to govern in
state court.” Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5 (2006).
190. See Gee, 325 F. App’x at 666.
191. 372 P.3d 1236 (Kan. Sup. Ct. 2016).
192. See Astorga v. Leavenworth Cnty. Sheriff, 475 P.3d 385 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020).
193. Clermont, supra note 189 at 31.
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Kansas state judges may be skeptical about whether the Supreme
Court will ultimately condone Hutcherson mutual exclusivity.
Third and finally, it is interesting to note that within the Eleventh
Circuit’s territorial ambit, Florida and Georgia state courts maintain a
tradition of declining to entertain requests for release from
administrative segregation in § 1983 actions. Instead, these courts tend
to redirect these claims into mandamus or habeas actions.194 It may be,
therefore, that Erie-like considerations195 induced the Eleventh Circuit
to adopt its present, outlying position on administrative segregation as
falling into the category or bucket of habeas.
C. Remedial Exceptions to Category Choices
A different liminal problem will arise as courts make category
choices, but then face ensuing remedial problems. One such problem,
addressed in Nance, has already arisen in the method-of-execution
context. The Authors anticipate that system-wide prison issues like
overcrowding will also prove problematic.
The case of Brown v. Plata,196 is a useful starting point for
illustrating the problem of remedial exceptions to category choices. In
Brown, a class of prisoners secured a federal provisional release order
as a remedy for significant, persistent overcrowding (and accompanying
healthcare deficiencies) within the California state prison system.
Brown was commenced under § 1983, and singly, the Eighth
Amendment claims raised in Brown are typical § 1983 fodder.197 En
masse, though, claims relating to system-wide deficiencies necessarily
implicate the remedy of release—the alternative remedy of constructing
additional prisons, after all, is problematic. In a mutually exclusive
paradigm, Brown-like, system-wide claims implicating the remedy of
release threaten to cross over the mutually exclusive boundary line,
moving from § 1983 territory into habeas territory. Brown-like
situations, in other words, strain category choices—such as that Eighth

194. See, e.g., Taylor v. Gee, No. 8:08-CV-2557-T-30MAP, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 61052, at
*2 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (“[t]he remedy of an extraordinary petition, specifically, a writ of
mandamus or of habeas corpus, is available in the Florida Courts”); Accord Daker v.
Allen, No. 6:17-cv-23, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 52883, at *13 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2020) (“[u]nder
Georgia law, issues regarding discipline in the prison context . . . are typically raised in a
mandamus action”) (internal quotations omitted).
195. See Adam N. Steinman, What is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does it Mean for
the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 311–12
(2008).
196. 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
197. Id. at 499–500.
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Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims always fall exclusively
into the bucket of § 1983.
The Nance case addresses the same problem, but in a different
context. Like most courts employing mutual exclusivity, the Eleventh
Circuit has assigned method-of-execution challenges to the category of
§ 1983. Most states now use lethal injections as their method of
execution, and a typical challenge attacks some aspect of the injection
process for creating an unnecessary risk of pain, as compared to an
authorized, alternative process. The plaintiff in Nance, however,
attacked Georgia’s lethal injection process based not on some aspect of
that process, but rather on his own health issues.198 Specifically, Nance
cited his (1) compromised veins, which would make intravenous
injection of any kind problematic, and (2) prolonged treatment with
gabapentin, which “altered his brain chemistry in a way that would
diminish the efficacy of the lethal injection drug[s] and leave him
sensate and in extreme pain during his execution.”199 Nance asked for
death by firing squad as an alternative process, but Georgia law only
authorizes lethal injections as its sole method of execution.200 In effect,
therefore, Nance’s lawsuit sought to have his sentence commuted from
death to life imprisonment.201
The Eleventh Circuit’s Nance panel in essence held that while
method-of-execution challenges generally are raised under § 1983, the
peculiar nature of Nance’s attack implicated the core of habeas, and
therefore needed to be raised in habeas.202 A petition for certiorari
review of Nance has been granted, and perhaps the Supreme Court will
offer guidance. Absent such guidance, cases such as Nance and Brown
reveal a lingering problem associated with the Hutcherson approach.
Even in a superficially mutually exclusive paradigm, the lower courts
may need to remain mindful of the Supreme Court’s cryptic notion of a
“core of habeas.”203 Difficulties will continue to arise as claims generally
associated with the category of § 1983 require remedies that implicate
core habeas concerns.
D. Application Errors
A fourth and final problem is the risk that courts will not follow their
own rules when applying the doctrine of mutual exclusivity.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Nance, 981 F.3d at 1203.
Id. at 1204.
Id. at 1205.
Id. at 1203.
Id.
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489.
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Arbitrariness is, of course, a commonplace jurisprudential concern, but
it has special bite here because it threatens to undermine the primary,
and perhaps only, selling point for the Hutcherson approach, clarity.
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Daker, well illustrates this
problem. The Authors have already discussed the Daker case at length
for its dubious assignment of administrative segregation claims to the
category of habeas, but the Daker case, it seems, is a font of perplexity.
The case is also problematic for its intermingling, within a single
action, both habeas claims and § 1983 claims. For context, Waseem
Daker, the plaintiff-cum-petitioner, is an abusive prison litigator204—
that is, precisely the type of litigant targeted by the PLRA’s reforms.
Daker commenced the case using a standard-form § 2254 petition, but
to this form, Daker attached a brief inconsistently invoking relief under
§ 1983, as well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA).205 Daker’s substantive claims wrought similar confusion:
Daker asked for release from segregation, but Daker also argued that
his conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment, and that
denials of Daker’s worship opportunities and ability to access the courts
violated his First Amendment rights.206 In a mutually exclusive
paradigm, these latter claims should fall within the category of § 1983.
Upon review of Daker’s filing, the district court “construed the
petition as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint and dismissed it pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g),” a screening authority not applicable in habeas
actions.207 The Eleventh Circuit “affirm[ed] the dismissal of Daker’s
properly construed § 1983 claims,” suggesting that Daker’s action was a
§ 1983 action.208 Yet the Eleventh Circuit also “vacate[d] the district
court’s order to the extent that it concluded that Daker’s proceduraldue-process claim was not cognizable in a § 2254 proceeding, and [it]
remand[ed] for further proceedings as to that claim.”209 This latter
ruling suggests that Daker’s action was instead a habeas action. All of
this begs the question, is the Daker case, or the notion of a hybrid
§ 1983-habeas action generally, reconcilable with Hutcherson mutual
exclusivity? In lieu of an answer, the Authors offer the following two
observations.
204. See Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[D]aker’s History
as a Serial Litigant.”).
205. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1–2000cc-5 (2000).
206. Daker, 999 F.3d at 1303–04.
207. Daker, 805 F. App’x at 649; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see Pickett v. Wise, 849 F. App’x
904 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[h]abeas corpus petitions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 are not
civil actions for purposes of the PLRA.”).
208. Daker, 805 F. App’x at 652.
209. Id. at 651.
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First, the Daker case might stand for the proposition that when lower
courts receive filings which intermix § 1983 claims with habeas claims,
those lower courts should perform a hypothetical screening under 28
U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A.210 If that hypothetical screening would
eliminate all § 1983 claims, then perhaps the lower courts should
construe the action as a habeas action and ignore the potential § 1983
claims. One problem with this interpretation is that it does not fit what
the Eleventh Circuit said in Daker. After all, the Daker panel affirmed
the district court’s “dismissal of Daker’s properly construed § 1983
claims.”211 A more serious problem is the notion of a hypothetical ruling.
Even claims-processing determinations such as the appropriate filing
fee—$402.00 for § 1983, $5.00 for habeas—or the three strikes bar, 42
U.S.C. § 1915(g), are appealable and reversible, so it would be
conceptually difficult to deem these determinations merely
“hypothetical.”
Second, it could be that hybrid actions are procedurally
impermissible, but that the appropriate remedy is a severance of
habeas claims and § 1983 claims into separate actions. If this is the
case, one wonders why the Daker panel did not instruct the district
court to work a severance on remand. A related issue is whether a
severance might, in essence, be achieved through a partial dismissal,
without prejudice, of either the § 1983 claims or the habeas claims
raised in a hybrid petition/complaint. On this point, Eleventh Circuit
caselaw provides that even pro se litigants are “subject to the relevant
law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”212 If the impermissibility of hybrid actions is a procedural
rule that even pro se parties must obey, why then did the district court
abuse its discretion by enforcing that rule in Daker v. Warden through a
non-prejudicial dismissal of Daker’s tag-along habeas claims?
The Authors’ take is that the Daker panel found nothing amiss in
permitting a hybrid action because the panel simply failed to apply
Hutcherson. In any event, in Daker’s wake, lower courts within the
Eleventh Circuit’s ambit must now confront added analytical difficulty
when facing prisoner filings that intermingle claims sounding in habeas
and § 1983. Hutcherson suggests that these avenues for relief are
mutually exclusive, but Daker suggests that litigants can intermingle
habeas and § 1983 claims after all.

210. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (1996).
211. Daker, 805 F. App’x at 652.
212. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).
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V. AN ASSESSMENT
The puzzling aspect to the Supreme Court’s Preiser v. Rodgriguez
opinion was always its cryptic reference to a core of habeas. The
quintessential habeas case involves a request for release from prison (if
only temporarily) based on an irregularity in criminal process. But
habeas, we know, can do much more, and the line between a
quintessential habeas case and a peripheral one is murky.
By jettisoning the notion of a core of habeas, the Eleventh Circuit in
Hutcherson may well have solved the Preiser Puzzle. Mutual exclusivity
between habeas and § 1983 brings clarity and ease of administrability
by pushing difficult choices to peripheral areas of law. There remains, of
course, the immediate problem of categorizing claims which is
troublesome because it involves arbitrariness, as all line-drawing
exercises do. Judges will resolve categorization problems in time
through trial and error. The truly difficult issues remaining after
Hutcherson, though—issues such as remedial exceptions to category
choices and the fluidity of the bounds of habeas—will arise only
infrequently.
The most damning indictment of the Eleventh Circuit’s Hutcherson
approach is that its rule embodies a legal meme. Other circuits have
since offered better analytical backing for mutual exclusivity, with the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Nettles, offering perhaps the best guidance.
Developments within the Eleventh Circuit, however, have been
discreditable. The Hutcherson panel failed to give any initial
justification for a rule of mutual exclusivity, and subsequent Eleventh
Circuit panels parroted Hutcherson’s rule without exploring its validity.
Federal appellate courts should be able to wrestle with analytical
complexity in written, public opinions. Yet sometimes, the simple
answer is the right answer. This appears to be the case with
Hutcherson mutual exclusivity. If the courts can avoid application
errors by punctiliously enforcing both the general rule and claim–
specific category choices, then mutual exclusivity offers a viable
framework for streamlining prison litigation. If Hutcherson is a legal
meme, then it is a felicitous one that, almost forty years on, may have
finally solved the Preiser Puzzle.

